What kind of memory does reid have

Reid offers two criticisms of the ancient theory, as he understands it. According to Reid, there is no observational evidence of the existence of impressions on the brain—they are merely theoretical entities Essays , Furthermore, even if we granted the otherwise theoretical existence of impressions, such entities would not be sufficient to explain memory.

We might establish a correlation between impressions and memories, but it would remain at best just that: a correlation, not a causal explanation. Though Reid identifies his target as having ancient origins, his primary concern is with what he regards as its modern equivalent. This modern theory was introduced by Locke and, according to Reid, extended to its inevitable idealist and skeptical conclusions by Berkeley and Hume.

As this passage illustrates, Locke himself acknowledges that the notion that the mind is a kind of repository or storehouse is metaphorical. Locke is committed to the thesis that ideas are momentary and non-continuous and to the thesis that identity over time requires continuous existence.

These two theses jointly entail that numerically identical ideas cannot be stored over time. In order to use a previous idea as its model, the mind must remember it.

But then the ability to paint ideas anew upon itself presupposes rather than explains memory. Locke offers a non-metaphorical account of memory when he claims that memory consists of two perceptions: a present perception and a belief about that present perception, namely that one has enjoyed the perception before. Because Locke is committed to the thesis that numerically identical ideas cannot be stored over time, the belief must be the belief that one has previously enjoyed a perception qualitatively similar to the present perception, rather than numerically identical with it.

Reid criticizes this account as circular, once more. Like Locke, Hume holds that ideas have no continued existence. And so, Reid argues, Hume cannot claim that a numerically identical idea can reappear. Hume accounts for memory by appealing to an idea that is qualitatively similar to, but less forceful and vivacious than a previous idea. But the ability to judge qualitative similarity and degrees of force and vivacity between present ideas and past impressions presupposes memory.

Reid interprets Hume as holding that these three faculties do not differ in kind, but rather in the degree of force and vivacity of the ideas that are their objects.

Ideas with the greatest degree of force and vivacity are perceptions, those with a lesser degree are memories, and those with the least degree of force and vivacity are imaginings. Reid criticizes this taxonomy on phenomenological grounds.

Some perceptions are less forceful and lively than some memories, as when lost in reminiscence, and some memories are less forceful and lively than imaginings, as when lost in reverie. Furthermore, increasing the degree of force and vivacity does not transform a memory or an imagining into a perception. Reid grants that perceptions, memories and imaginings often differ in degree of force and vivacity, but, he argues, this difference is insufficient to account for the special quality of presentness represented in perceptions, the special quality of pastness represented in memories, and the special quality of atemporality represented in imaginings Inquiry , While memories may be faint, or weak, these features are not necessary to these states being memories, and so cannot be used to individuate them.

In addition, a present idea—whatever its degree of force and vivacity—cannot ground judgments about events in the past because present ideas represent events as present. Present ideas contain no information, qualitatively or representationally, that could serve as the basis of judgments about past events. As a result, no reflection on present ideas and their quality or character is sufficient for a representation of events in the past, as past.

Contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists recognize that memory is a diverse phenomenon and they draw some useful distinctions among varieties of memory. Remembering how to ride a bike is an example of procedural memory. Remembering that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo is an example of a semantic memory. The distinction most relevant to the issues Reid, Locke and Hume raise for memory and personal identity is between semantic and episodic memory. Episodic memories are further distinguished from semantic memories by the Previous Awareness Condition on episodic memory.

The Previous Awareness Condition has been developed and examined by Sydney Shoemaker , among others. Put simply, one has an episodic memory of an event only if one was agent or witness to the event remembered.

The Previous Awareness Condition is a necessary but insufficient condition on episodic memory. If one has an experience as of being lost in a store as a child, but one was not in fact lost in a store as a child, such an experience is not an episodic memory. On the other hand, each of us has been agent or witness to many events of which we have no episodic memory. Reid is most interested in episodic memory. Though Reid does not use the contemporary terminology, his theory draws upon both the distinction between episodic and semantic memory and the Previous Awareness Condition on episodic memory.

As he puts the matter:. Acquaintance presupposes apprehension, and prior episodes of apprehension are necessary for retained acquaintance. According to Reid, episodic memory is not a current apprehension of a past event, nor is it a current apprehension of a past experience.

Rather, according to Reid, memory is an act that preserves a past apprehension. Reid characterizes memory as exhibiting what we now call the Previous Awareness Condition. He holds that reports of episodic memory are true only if the person reporting satisfies the condition, and that experiences that otherwise appear to be episodic memories, but which fail the condition, are not episodic memories Essays , He discounts them not because they fail to meet the Previous Awareness Condition, but because he holds that semantic memories are better classified as beliefs or knowledge rather than memories.

For example, he would hold that a person today who reports remembering that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo expresses a belief or knowledge rather than a memory.

He holds this because he requires a distinction between two sorts of beliefs that would otherwise be obscured by the fact that each sort can be expressed in the form of a semantic memory report. The distinction is between beliefs that play a role in preserving past apprehension and which are constituents of episodic memory , and those that do not play a role in preserving past apprehension and which are not, strictly speaking, memories. For example, Jane believes that she dined with a friend last night.

According to Reid, a memory consists in a conception of a past event and a belief about that past event, that it happened to the person who is represented in that memory as agent or witness Essays , , , , Folescu a examines whether memorial conception differs from or is the same as the kind of conception ingredient in perception, consciousness, and other intentional mental states.

In particular, it is a belief that it happened to me, where the pronoun is indexed to the person who is represented in the memory as agent or witness to the event Essays , , The belief is about or of the event because the other constituent of memory—the conception—supplies the event, which is the object of the belief.

Memory preserves past apprehensions by relating us to the events originally presented in perception—memory preserves past apprehension through conception and belief. In particular, the objects of memory are not the past apprehensions themselves but that which is presented in the past apprehensions, namely, the original event Inquiry , According to Reid, we remember events that were apprehended in the past by perception.

But Reid insists that perception is confined to the present. Because perception is confined to the present, we cannot perceive events, which have a duration. How, then, can we remember what we cannot have perceived? Reid holds that memory is not a current apprehension of an event already presented in a past apprehension. In other words, we do not remember events by re-apprehending them.

Rather, the past apprehension is itself preserved by the act of remembering the event apprehended. Memory is an act of preservation through conception and belief. Such preservation does not itself constitute an additional apprehension over and above the apprehension preserved. Indeed, according to Reid, it is impossible to currently apprehend any events in the past; apprehension is confined to perceiving present objects or being conscious of present mental operations Essays , 23, Reid does not deny that memory is itself a current mental state, nor does he deny that memory presupposes a past apprehension.

He denies only that memory is a current apprehension, and that the object of a memory is a past apprehension Essays , Memory preserves past apprehension by conceiving of an event previously apprehended and believing, of this event, that it happened to me.

Reid holds that memory, like perception, is immediate. Neither the conception nor the belief that are the ingredients of memory are formed on the basis of reasoning or testimony. In order to infer to a past event, one must have some prior, non-inferential relation to the event if it is to be a memory rather than a belief or knowledge.

But then this prior, non-inferential relation would be an episodic memory. In addition, if episodic memory involved an inference to the effect that the event happened to me, the inference would be otiose because, as Reid claims, such a belief is already an immediate, non-inferential component of episodic memory.

In principle, one could infer from the conception and belief that are ingredients in memory to a further belief that the event happened. But if such a belief plays a role in preserving past apprehension then it is superfluous—such a belief, subject to the Previous Awareness Condition, is already embedded in episodic memory. If the belief does not play a role in preserving past apprehension then it is a semantic memory, which, according to Reid, is among the species of belief or knowledge rather memory.

The distinction between beliefs that are ingredients in episodic memories and beliefs that are based on, but not ingredients in, episodic memories allows Reid to account for cases in which a memorial experience continues to represent an event as having happened, even when the person who seems to remember the event has what she regards as an overriding reason to believe that the event did not occur.

The belief that is an ingredient in the experience represents the event as having happened to the person who seems to remember it.

Despite most things about the highly intelligent FBI agent being easily noticeable, there's still a wealth of information about him that remains hidden. He also holds BAs in Sociology and Psychology. In Season 6's "Big Sea," he also demonstrates knowledge in Forensic Anthrolopoly by accurately determining the races and sexes of skeletal remains.

Reid has always been portrayed as intelligent and dedicated, so his numerous qualifications aren't at all surprising. While he might appear focused only on the sciences, that's not the case. His general knowledge is vast and at some point, he had considered studying Literature. But in typical Spencer Reid fashion, he had read all the course books so he opted to do something different.

Spencer Reid has an eidetic memory and an impressive IQ of This detail is revealed when he is first introduced by Hotch to Woodland. The latter thinks that Reid is too young to have gone to medical school but Reid clarifies that his "doctor" title is from having three PhDs. He also reveals his IQ and adds that he can read 20, words per minute. It takes a smarter person to read the minds of criminals and at , Reid's IQ is way higher than that of Albert Einstein whose figure stood at Reid's IQ is also equal to that of another popular TV character.

Reid never wears matching socks. This behavior is actually linked to actor Matthew Gray Gubler himself. He revealed in an interview that his grandmother once told him that wearing mismatched socks brings good luck. It's not a superstition that's only confined to the show. In the real world, a number of people also believe that mismatched socks actually attract Lady Luck.

Fans of the show might want to attempt wearing their socks like Dr. Spencer Reid to see whether they'll be lucky in different areas of life. I just love entertaining. I will do anything — stand-up comedy, video games, fencing, internet shorts — I just want to keep being lucky enough to entertain people anyway I can.

I try never to limit my art to a medium. So there you have it. Matthew Gray Gubler. He is the definition of a multitalented performer, and I hope this convinced you to dive into his work in more depth to truly see what he has to offer. Now that Criminal Minds is edging towards its final bow, what does Matthew Gray Gubler have in store? This site uses Akismet to reduce spam.

Learn how your comment data is processed. Sign in. Forgot your password? Password recovery. Recover your password. Get help. Friday, November 12, By Haley. January 23, Share this: Print. Leave a Reply Cancel reply. Haley Haley joined the Nerds and Beyond team in and is a writer, editor, and Instagram manager.

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